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ABSTRACT
Great Lakes iron ore producers had faced no competition from foreign iron ore in the Great Lakes steel market
for nearly a century as the 1970s closed. In the early 1980s, as a result of unprecedented developments in
the world steel market, Brazilian producers were oﬀering to deliver iron ore to Chicago (the heart of the
Great Lakes market) at prices substantially below local iron ore prices. The U.S. and Canadian iron ore
industries faced a major crisis that cast doubt on their future. In response to the crisis, these industries
dramatically increased productivity. Labor productivity doubled in a few years (whereas it had changed
little in the preceding decade). Materials productivity increased by more than half. Capital productivity
increased as well. I show that most of the productivity gains were due to changes in work practices. Work
practice changes reduced overstaﬃng and hence increased labor productivity. Changes in work practices, by
increasing the fraction of time equipment was in operating mode, also signiﬁcantly increased materials and
capital productivity.
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For nearly a century following the development of iron ore mining in Minnesota in the 1880s,
Minnesota mines, together with a few others in the Great Lakes region, were the sole suppliers of
iron ore to the Great Lakes region steel market (that is, the vast steel market lying along the lower
rims of Lakes Michigan and Erie and running on toward Pittsburgh). This century-long dominance
was primarily attributable to one fact: these mines had signiﬁcantly lower transport charges to these
steel producers than mines outside the region. Large transport costs had meant that non-Great-
Lakes iron ore was not competitive in the region for nearly a century as the 1970s closed, and there
was every reason to believe this situation would persist for many more years.
But it didn’t. In the early 1980s, as a result of unprecedented developments in the world
steel market, Brazilian producers were oﬀering to deliver iron ore to Chicago at prices substantially
below local iron ore prices. Minnesota mines were being challenged in the Great Lakes region steel
market, essentially their only market. More generally, the Great Lakes regional producers, that is,
the U.S. and Canadian iron ore industries, faced a major crisis that cast doubt on their future.1
In response to the crisis, these industries changed how they produced iron ore, dramatically
increasing productivity in the process. Labor productivity doubled in a few years (whereas it had
changed little in the preceding decade). Materials productivity increased by more than half. Capital
productivity increased as well. As a result, the potential foreign competition was pushed out of the
Great Lakes region.
I show that most of the productivity gains were due to changes in work practices that gov-
erned how production took place. Rigid work practices led to overstaﬃng. They also led equipment
to be in nonproduction mode signiﬁcant amounts of each day. A loosening of work practices there-
fore increased labor productivity for two reasons: it led to less overstaﬃng, and it led to greater
1Nearly all U.S. and Canadian iron ore production was accounted for by Great Lakes mines (that is, those within
a short distance of one of the Great Lakes).output (as machines ran more continuously). This latter impact, of having machines run more
continuously, obviously increased capital productivity. It also increased materials productivity since
many materials are consumed even if machines are in nonproduction mode. In answer to my ques-
tion, “What determines productivity?” the experience of these industries clearly shows ﬁrst, that
competition does, and second, that work practices do.
The experience of these industries presents a great “experiment” to analyze the age-old view
that if industries are protected by high tariﬀs, or restrictions on new entrants, or, as with these
industries, the vagaries of geography, their productivity will suﬀer. The ﬂip side of this view, of
course, is that reductions in tariﬀs and the like will make industries more productive. On this view,
the increases in productivity are driven by all producers raising their productivity and not simply
by a selection process weeding out ineﬃcient producers. While this view is age-old, and whether or
not it’s true is a matter of great importance, there is very little work “testing” it. One reason is the
diﬃculty of ﬁnding good measures of increased competition. But here the increase in competitive
pressure is clear and large. The “experiment” studied here provides strong support for the age-old
view.2
I now preview the rest of the paper. I show that these industries had been highly protected
until the late 1970s. Though the protection was aﬀorded by large transport costs, it can, of course,
be thought of as high tariﬀs as well. I then show that (exogenous) changes in world steel production
in the early 1980s dramatically increased competition faced by these industries, changes that were
akin to a falling tariﬀ on iron ore. I show that in response to the crisis both industries doubled
their labor productivity in a few years.3 In Canada, materials productivity increased by 60 percent.
2Other recent studies about the relationship between competition and productivity include Borenstein and Farrell
(1999), Bridgman and Schmitz (2004), Galdón-Sánchez and Schmitz (2002), Holmes and Schmitz (2001), MacDonald
(1994), Markiewicz, Rose, and Wolfram (2004), Nickell (1996), Sivadasan (2003), and Symeonidis (2002). Most of
these papers look at changes in competition and its inﬂuence on productivity. Syverson (2003) examines diﬀerences
in competition in a cross section of geographically isolated concrete industries and the impact on productivity. Clark
(1987) looks at productivity across countries within an industry.
3Galdón-Sánchez and Schmitz (2002) show that as a result of developments in world steel production in the 1980s,
some national iron ore industries, like the U.S. and Canadian industries, came under tremendous competitive pressure,
2For the U.S. industry, materials productivity also increased, but less than in Canada. Total factor
productivity (TFP) also soared in the Canadian industry. It grew at nearly two-thirds the rate of
labor productivity. Data are not available to calculate U.S. industry TFP.
I show that a long list of conventional factors had only a small impact on labor, materials,
and capital productivity (Y/N, Y/M,a n dY/K, respectively). The ﬁrst four factors would pri-
marily inﬂuence industry TFP (and hence Y/N, Y/M,a n dY/K). First, perhaps the “best” mines
survived. Using mine level data, and a standard labor productivity growth decomposition, I show
that closing low productivity mines (and shifting production to high productivity mines) had little
impact on industry labor productivity. Second, changes in the scale of production at individual
mines also had little impact on productivity. Another top candidate, of course, is improvement
in technology. But third, technology changed little in the U.S. and Canadian iron ore industries
during the 1980s. Fourth, available evidence indicates that improvements in the average skill of the
workforce contributed little to the gains. In sum, conventional factors that might have increased
industry TFP, and hence Y/N, Y/M,a n dY/K, had only a small role to play.
I next focus on labor productivity, considering conventional factors that might have led to
the increases in materials per hour and capital per hour (which together contributed a small amount
to labor productivity growth). Conventional factors had little to do with these increases. Labor
did not become expensive relative to materials and capital, which would have led to substitution
toward materials and capital. The crisis led to removal of some restrictions in union contracts on
what mines could purchase, including some repair parts and some services of oﬀ-site contractors.
Dropping these restrictions was responsible for a small part of the increase in materials per hour,
but only a very small part.
Taken together, these conventional factors led to a modest increase in productivity, but not
while others, like the Australian and Brazilian industries, came under little or none. They show that in the former
group productivity soared, while in the latter group it changed little. This paper provides a detailed study of the
sources of productivity gains in these former industries.
3the surges experienced in these industries. This leads me to changes in work practices. I label this
an unconventional factor since the idea that such changes could have dramatic impacts on Y/N,
Y/M, and Y/K is not found in the economics literature. But they are not an unimportant factor
in the business reporting on these industries’ recovery. They are typically accorded the central role
in the productivity gains.4
Before the crisis, labor-management relations in these industries were very adversarial. Work
was performed under rigid work practices. Two stand out, both involving repair work. First,
machine operators were not permitted to set up, maintain, or perform simple repairs on their
m a c h i n e s( o rt oh e l pr e p a i rs t a ﬀ if they were summoned). Second, repair staﬀ had restrictions on
their work. There were a large number of repair job classiﬁcations, close to 30. A person with a given
classiﬁcation was permitted to complete repair jobs assigned to this classiﬁcation but not others.
After the crisis, there was a thawing of labor-management relations. The situation was obviously
dire: 25 percent of the mines in Minnesota were mothballed. The rest were closed for temporary
periods as owners considered permanent shutdown. In such a scenario, many miners voluntarily
changed work practices. Loosening of work practices also resulted from signiﬁcant changes in union
contracts: labor-management cooperation teams were started, proﬁt-sharing plans were introduced,
and formal work rules were changed.
These changes in work practices had a signiﬁcant impact on productivity. I ﬁrst sketch some
theory where work practices are thought of as restrictions on how ﬁrms can use inputs. A well-known
work practice in railroads was the requirement that diesel trains carry ﬁremen. This is a classic case
of overstaﬃng. Remove the work practice, and labor productivity increases, though little else. The
work practices described above have an overstaﬃng feature, but much more. When a mine hires
repair staﬀ to complete tasks that machine operators could easily perform, this leads to overstaﬃng.
4See “Taconite Is Back,” Minneapolis Star Tribune, January 8, 1996. See also Marcus and Kirsis, with Kakela
(1987, ch. 1, p. 50).
4But since the machine operator must wait for the repair staﬀ t ot r a v e lt ot h es i t et oc o m p l e t et h e
task, machines are in nonproduction mode longer than necessary. Detailed job classiﬁcations also
lead to unnecessary delays. As mentioned above, easing work practices then led to less overstaﬃng
and greater output (as machines ran a larger fraction of a day), increasing Y/N, Y/M,a n dY/K.
In e x tp r e s e n tevidence that changes in work practices signiﬁcantly increased Y/N, Y/M,
and Y/K. Consider overstaﬃng. Repair staﬀs were a large share of employment at many mines,
about 50 percent. Overstaﬃng was therefore potentially large. And it was, in fact, large. During
the crisis, mines did studies indicating that for every ﬁve machine operators that were permitted to
set up, maintain, and help with machine repairs, repair staﬀ could be reduced by two. In the largest
Minnesota mine, repair staﬀ fell from about 50 percent to 25 percent of employment (during which
period total employment fell by half and output returned to precrisis levels). I also provide evidence
on mine speed. For example, sections in union contracts that introduced changes in work practices
explicitly recognized that the changes would lead to greater periods of machinery operation (and
hence output). I also provide evidence on overstaﬃng and “speed” jointly. I show that U.S. mines
that changed work practices the most (and had the greatest reduction in overstaﬃng and the biggest
increase in machine usage) had the greatest increases in labor productivity.
In sum, there is little doubt that increased foreign competition spurred the productivity gains
in these industries. The evidence is also quite strong that changes in work practices were the primary
driver of productivity, there being both indirect (that conventional factors played a small role) and
direct evidence. This naturally leads to the question, “Why were work practices not changed before
the crisis?” I brieﬂy consider this question in the conclusion.
2. A Dramatic Increase in Competition
Here I show that for many years these industries were protected from foreign competition
in the Great Lakes region (GLR) steel market. I then discuss the dramatic increase in foreign
5competition in the early 1980s.5
Nearly all U.S. iron ore is produced within a short distance of one of the Great Lakes, in
Minnesota (near Duluth) and Michigan (on the Upper Peninsula). For U.S. producers, the GLR
steel market was essentially their only market. Canadian producers lie along the Great Lakes and
also farther north and east of the Great Lakes, near Labrador City. Canadian ore was sold in the
GLR steel market but, given the eastward location of the Labrador mines, it was shipped to Europe
and the U.S. east coast as well. Here I focus on describing the increased competition faced by the
mines that overwhelmingly sold in the GLR steel market.6
Transport charges typically loom large in delivered iron ore prices since a ton often sells for
as little as $10 at the mine. Potential foreign competitors (that is, non-U.S. and non-Canadian
producers) in the GLR market faced large transport costs into the Great Lakes. For many years,
these costs provided ample protection to local producers. To see this, consider the entry decision of
Brazilian producers, the overwhelming leader in exports in the Atlantic Basin region and the only
real potential threat to local producers. During the 1970s, Brazil sent a large share of its production
to Europe, where negotiations between Brazilian iron ore producers and European steel producers
set iron ore prices in Europe. (See Hellmer 1997.) Call this price pB,E (that is, the price of Brazilian
iron ore in Europe). Brazilian producers would have found it proﬁtable to ship iron ore to Chicago,
instead of Europe, if the local Chicago price, call it pM,C (that is, the price of Minnesota iron ore
in Chicago), net of the ocean transport cost from Brazil to Chicago, call it tB,C, exceeded the price
per ton in Europe, net of the ocean transport cost from Brazil to Europe, call it tB,E.7 This would
5U.S. and Canadian iron ore production in 1980 was 70.7 and 48.7 million metric tons, respectively. Their combined
production amounted to 21.4 percent of world output (noncommunist) in 1980. Employment at U.S. and Canadian
mines in 1980 was 18.2 and 13.8 thousand, respectively.
6As for the Canadian mines that sold to Europe, Galdón-Sánchez and Schmitz (2002) describe the increased
competitive pressure faced by these mines in the 1980s.
7In this discussion I am implicitly assuming that Brazil has a ﬁxed capacity at a point in time and that capacity is
expensive to build. This was true in the iron ore industry. For example, Brazil did open a huge mine in the Amazon
(the Carajas mine) in the late 1980s, but only after the World Bank agreed to fund the huge infrastructure (like the
rail and port facilities) costs of opening the mine.
6be true if the Chicago price satisﬁed pM,C > b pM,C, where
b pM,C = pB,E +[ tB,C − tB,E]. (1)
At the Chicago and European prices that prevailed in the late 1970s, the Brazilians would have
experienced large losses shifting iron ore from Europe to Chicago, that is, pM,C < b pM,C.8 There
was little fear of entry from Brazil in the GLR steel market.9
I say that transport costs provided protection to local GLR producers because the diﬀerence
in transport costs [tB,C − tB,E] was large. In particular, it was often one-third to one-half the
European price pB,E.10 Hence, the large transport charges into the Great Lakes would allow the
local price pM,C to climb high, as much as 50 percent higher than the European price, before this
ceiling price b pM,C was reached.
Foreign competition dramatically increased in the early 1980s. This was precipitated by
huge drops in Atlantic Basin steel production. In Figure 1, I plot pig iron production of the
United States (in total, and for two exhaustive regions, the Great Lakes region and the rest of the
country), Canada, and the three largest European producers combined. (Data sources are discussed
in Appendix A.)11 Iron ore producers had little inﬂuence on the path of pig iron production; it
was essentially exogenous to them.12 U.S. pig iron production fell dramatically from 1979 to 1982.
8Marcus and Kirsis, with Kakela (1987) estimate that (in 1978) the price of Brazilian pellets (a type of iron ore, see
below) delivered to Chicago would have exceeded the prevailing Chicago price by more than 20 percent. See Exhibit
Z-1-18.
9This discussion has focused on the potential threat of foreign competition in the 1970s. Before the 1970s, there
was absolutely no threat. Brazil was still a very small producer.
10To obtain information on pB,E, tB,C,a n dtB,E in equation (1), one typically must pull together data from diﬀerent
sources. One exception is a study of iron ore made by Natural Resources Canada (NRC) in 1994. Though the data
are for 1994, they still speak to the main issue at hand. NRC estimates that Brazil to Europe ocean charges were
tB,E =$ 6 .50 and Brazil to Chicago ocean charges were tB,C =$ 2 4 .35. The delivered price of Brazilian pellets (a
type of iron ore, see below) in Europe was pB,E =$ 3 8 .03. The diﬀerence in transport charges was 47 percent of the
European price. See Gáldon-Sánchez and Schmitz (2002).
11Regarding Figure 1, integrated-steel producers turn iron ore into pig iron in the steel-making process, so pig iron
is a better indicator of demand for iron ore than steel production (which includes minimill production).
12The huge drops in U.S. and European integrated-steel production in 1979—82, and its anemic growth afterward,
were driven by many factors, including a major recession, the movement of steel production toward Asia, the growth
of minimills, which primarily use scrap and not virgin iron ore, and the accelerated substitution of plastics for steel
due to energy price increases. Iron ore producers, whose product makes up a small share of steel production costs
(around 10 percent), had little chance to inﬂuence these factors inﬂuencing steel production.
7GLR production fell less than in the rest of the country. The drop in GLR pig iron production
was obviously a blow to GLR iron ore producers. But the drop in production on the U.S. east and
south coasts (which were supplied by non-U.S. iron ore, including Brazil) and, more important, the
drop in European production sent the prices of European iron ore falling. For example, Brazilian
dock prices for European iron ore, that is, pB,E −tB,E in (1), fell over 25 percent from 1982 to 1984
(where they remained for the next three years).13 This drop in European prices sent the ceiling price
b pM,C tumbling. The fall in the ceiling price was large enough that Brazilian iron ore was now a real
threat in the GLR market. Brazilian iron ore was being oﬀered at a substantial discount relative
to local iron ore.14 The U.S. and Canadian industries faced the possibility that large portions of
them would permanently close. It was immaterial, of course, whether the ceiling price was falling
due to tumbling European prices or lower transport charges into the Great Lakes, tB,C, so that this
episode was akin to an (exogenous) tariﬀ reduction.
Not surprisingly, the dramatic increase in competition cut into large rents that had been
earned by groups in these industries before the early 1980s. Consider some of these rents. The
Minnesota townships where mines were located charged a tax on each ton of iron ore produced
(amounting to about 10 percent of mine value). The United Steelworkers of America (USW),
the union that represented hourly and salary workers at the mines in both countries, provided its
workers with attractive job packages (as shown below). Though I have little information on local
managers (that is, the salaried workers who were not unionized) or owners, they probably did well
too. That rents evaporated with increased foreign competition in the early 1980s is clear. Towns
13These Brazilian iron ore prices can be found on the USGS Web site.
14For example, recall Marcus and Kirsis, with Kakela (1987) putting the price of Brazilian pellets delivered to
Chicago (in the late 1970s) more than 20 percent higher than local pellets. This report estimates that the price
situation completely reversed by the early 1980s, that the price of Brazilian pellets in Chicago would have been more
than 20 percent below the prevailing price. Again, see Exhibit Z-1-18. Also, during this period, the Wall Street
Journal reported that “importers are oﬀering high-grade Brazilian iron ore to steelmakers in Chicago and Cleveland
at $12 to $15 a ton under the price of Mesabi taconite [Minnesota pellets].” (See “Pocket of Poverty: Minnesota Iron
Range,” Wall Street Journal, November 26, 1984.)
8cut their production tax in the 1980s.15 A striking piece of evidence is that a Minnesota mine
(Reserve/Northshore) mothballed in 1986 reopened non-union in 1990. I think most industry par-
ticipants in the late 1970s would have found it nearly impossible to imagine a non-union Minnesota
mine a decade later. At the mines where the union remained, the USW and its workers lost signiﬁ-
cant compensation and beneﬁts. Nominal wages were signiﬁcantly cut. That the USW provided its
workers great beneﬁts before 1980 is attested to by the fact that most of the attrition in the mines
during the crisis was from less senior employees, indicating jobs were still in demand and how good
t h ej o b sw e r eb e f o r et h ec r i s i s .
To understand why local competition before 1980 was not enough to spur productivity nor to
prevent groups from capturing substantial rents, consider the calculus of a potential entrant, say a
U.S. steel ﬁrm that did not own a mine.16 If it opened a new mine, it would have to locate where the
ore was (and hence where the existing mines were). In all likelihood, the entrant would be treated
(by the towns, the USW, and local managers) just as the existing mines were. That is, there was
likely little room to improve productivity and reduce costs.17 Hence, local competition could not be
expected to spur productivity nor to drive down taxes, and it did not do so.18
3. Increased Competition Met by Huge Productivity Gains
Here I show that the dramatic increase in foreign competition was met by large increases in
labor, materials, and capital productivity in both U.S. and Canadian industries. I then present TFP
estimates for Canada’s industry. These productivity gains pushed the foreign competition threat
15See, for example, “Iron Ore Industry May Need More Than Tax Cut,” Minneapolis Star Tribune, March 30, 1986.
16The iron ore industries in both countries were primarily owned by the largest U.S. steel producers, including U.S.
Steel, Bethlehem, and LTV, though there was ownership by non—steel-producing ﬁrms (for example, Cleveland Cliﬀs).
17In fact, the Inland Steel Company opened a new mine in Minnesota in the late 1970s as integrated-steel production
was forecast to grow strongly. The new mine opened under essentially the same union contract, and faced the same
taxes, as the existing mines.
18That input suppliers with a monopoly (the towns, USW, and so on) would exploit their position was not lost on
investors in Minnesota when the pellet industry was developed in the late 1950s. Investors realized that towns could
tax them very heavily once mines were built. So, before mines were built, investors demanded and received changes
to the Minnesota constitution limiting taxation on pellets. (See Davis (1964).)
9up and out of the Great Lakes region.19
Because there are good measures of (real) gross output Yt for the iron ore industry, labor
productivity, that is, (real) gross output per hour, is relatively easy to measure. While iron ore is
not a homogeneous product, there are only three major types – lump, concentrates, and pellets. In
s o m ei n s t a n c e s ,Ia ma b l et ol o o ka tp r o d u c t i o nb yw e i g h t( f o re x a m p l e ,t o n s )p e rh o u rf o rag i v e n
type of iron ore. Otherwise, I can use total tons (the sum across the types) per hour. I also have
the typical measure of (real) gross output per hour, where output is industry revenue deﬂated by a
price index (which is likely a more accurate measure of output here than in most industries given
the few types of product).
Let me start with production (tons) per hour by type of iron ore. The output and labor
productivity of the Minnesota pellet industry is given in Figure 2. Minnesota pellet production
accounted for nearly two-thirds (62 percent) of U.S. iron ore production (by weight) in 1980. It fell
on the order of 50 percent in 1980—82. While this was a massive drop, the fear was, as the preceding
section emphasized, that production would continue to fall as foreign iron ore producers entered the
GLR to replace markets they lost elsewhere. Productivity showed little trend over the 1970s. It
did vary somewhat with output, tending to be procyclical. The path of productivity in the 1980s
was dramatically diﬀerent from that in the 1970s. The crisis led to a strong upward trend in labor
productivity. At its peak in 1987, productivity in Minnesota pellet production was more than twice
its 1980 level.20
The output and labor productivity of the entire U.S. iron ore industry is given in Figure 3.
The pattern of output and productivity for the U.S. industry looks similar to that in the Minnesota
pellet industry. The growth in productivity in 1980—87 is a little less for the entire industry, but
19At the end of 1980s, the governor of Minnesota, Rudy Perpich, celebrated the tremendous productivity gains in a
speech where he noted that Minnesota pellets were now “competitive with Brazilian ore coming into the lakes.” (See
“Minnesota May Be on the Brink of a Golden Age,” Minneapolis Star Tribune, February 21, 1988.)
20The quality of Minnesota pellets increased over the 1980s as limestone began to be added to them. (They were
called ﬂux pellets.) Adding limestone required, among other things, more labor per ton. Hence, this change would
have meant that, everything else equal, labor productivity would fall (though it soared).
10it still doubles over this short period. The output and labor productivity of the Canadian iron ore
industry is given in Figure 4. The experience of the Canadian industry looks similar to that of the
U.S. industry.21
The Canadian industry’s materials productivity, Yt/Mt, and capital productivity, Yt/Kt,a r e
given in Figure 5. I present two capital productivity series, one using capital stock to measure Kt
(the typical measure) and the other using capital services. The (real) materials Mt and (real) capital
services series Kt only begin in 1981. After initially falling at the beginning of the crisis, materials
productivity increased signiﬁcantly throughout the 1980s. At its peak in the middle 1980s, materials
productivity was nearly 60 percent higher than its 1981 level. This surge in materials productivity
probably had as large an impact on proﬁtability as did labor productivity’s surge, since materials’
share of revenue was larger than labor’s share. Capital productivity fell at the beginning of the
crisis. As with materials, capital productivity trended up over the decade. At its peak in the middle
1980s, capital productivity (using the capital stock series) was 40 percent higher than its 1981 level;
with capital services it was 15 percent higher.
For the U.S. iron ore industry, there are no oﬃcially published data for Mt and Kt.T h e
lowest level of aggregation for which these statistics are available is the metal mines industry, which
includes the copper, gold, and iron ore industries (and a bit more).22 However, the U.S. Census
Bureau’s Census of Minerals Industries (CMI) provides extensive information on materials spending
at U.S. iron ore mines at ﬁve-year intervals. For many materials, quantities consumed are also
provided. From this information, I can take a stab at estimating real materials growth between
21In Figure 3, output is measured in tons. Using “deﬂated” industry revenue as the output measure leads to a
nearly identical ﬁgure. In Figure 4, output is measured using “deﬂated” industry revenue. Since in Canada the tons
and “deﬂated” industry revenue measures diﬀer by a small amount, I use “deﬂated” industry revenue since this is
likely a better measure. But the measure with tons produces a very similar ﬁgure. See Appendix A for a discussion.
22The behavior of productivity in the U.S. metal mining industry in the 1980s looks similar to that in the Canadian
and U.S. iron ore industries. In particular, over the 1980s, Y/N more than doubled, Y/K nearly doubled, and Y/M,
after initially falling, entered the 1990s 50 percent higher. Metal mining industry statistics can be found on Dale
Jorgenson’s Web site, in the KLEM data set. Discussion of the U.S. copper industry can be found in Aydin and
Tilton (2000), who show that the doubling of U.S. copper labor productivity in the 1980s had little to do with closing
ineﬃcient mines.
111982 and 1987. (See Appendix B.) Between these years, I estimate that U.S. materials productivity
increased about 25 percent.23 The data on capital stock in the CMI are not extensive enough to
make estimates of real capital growth.
To estimate the Canadian industry’s TFP growth, I make a fairly standard assumption that
industry production can be modeled with a Cobb-Douglas production function
Yt = AtF(·)=At(Nt)θN(Mt)θM(Kt)θK (2)
where Yt is gross output, At is a TFP parameter, Mt is purchased materials (electricity and fuel,
plus supplies, plus contract work), Kt is capital services, Nt is hours of labor, and θN, θM,a n d
θK are the elasticities of output with respect to hours, materials, and capital, respectively. With
this technology, TFP is simply the product of Yt/Nt, Yt/Mt,a n dYt/Kt (with each productivity











What I assume about the θs obviously will inﬂuence TFP calculations. Here I make the common
assumption that the elasticities are equal to the respective input’s share in industry revenue.25 But,
as it turns out, as far as the theme of this paper is concerned, not a lot hinges on this assumption. For
example, consider the issue of what drove labor productivity growth. I am not going to argue that
conventional factors were important for growth in some of the terms on the right side of equation
(3) but not for others. I argue that conventional factors had little impact on any of the three terms.
Put diﬀerently, I argue below that changes in work practices were the major factor driving each of
23According to my estimate, the U.S. industry experienced a smaller increase in materials productivity than did the
Canadian industry. This may be due in part to what are likely conservative assumptions I made in estimating the
U.S. quantity. (See Appendix B.)
24Note that I use the capital services series in estimating TFP. If I instead used the capital stock series, TFP growth
would be greater.
25I let the shares vary over time. Labor’s share of revenue varies roughly between 19 and 21 percent. Materials’
share of revenue varies more widely, typically between 53 and 63 percent, though mostly in the middle 50s.
12the three terms on the right side of (3). If I split growth in labor productivity diﬀerently among the
three terms, little in my argument is aﬀected.
Canadian TFP estimates are given in Figure 6 (where I choose units so that At =1in 1981).
TFP initially falls but then signiﬁcantly rises over the middle 1980s. At its peak in the middle
1980s, TFP was 48 percent higher than its 1981 level (and labor productivity 79 percent higher).26
In Figure 6, I also plot (for later reference) Yt/Nt, (Mt/Nt)θM,a n d(Kt/Nt)θK. Table 1 lists these
quantities.
4. Conventional Factors Play a Small Role in Productivity Gains
In this section I show that a long list of conventional factors contributed little to gains in
Yt/Nt, Yt/Mt,a n dYt/Kt.
A. Closing Low Productivity Mines?
Suppose some mines were much “better” than others, requiring less labor, materials and
capital to produce a ton of iron ore. Closing the “worse” mines would then increase industry TFP.
While I don’t have materials and capital by mine, I do have hours worked and tons produced. If low
labor productivity mines were closed, or production shifted toward high productivity mines, then
industry labor productivity would increase. An analysis of mine level data for the Minnesota pellet
industry, whose output and labor productivity are given in Figure 2, shows that these were small
sources of industry labor productivity growth.
Eight Minnesota pellet mines were in operation in 1980, and their output and labor produc-
tivity records are given in Figure 7.27 The labor productivity pattern at each mine mirrors, fairly
26Labor productivity in Figure 4 was 100 percent higher at its peak in the 1980s relative to 1980.I nF i g u r e6 ,Ih a v e
plotted labor productivity from 1981 onward (since that is when the other variables are ﬁrst available). Compared to
1981, the peak is 79 percent higher.
27Six pellet mines were in operation by the middle 1960s (Butler, Erie/LTV, Eveleth, Reserve/Northshore, National,
and Minntac). Two mines began operations at the end of the 1970s (Hibbing and Minorca). As a result of the crisis
in the early 1980s, all mines were closed for temporary periods as owners considered their permanent shutdown. Two
mines were closed for periods of years, even though both had shown productivity gains. Butler was closed in 1986.
Reserve was closed in 1987 and reopened in 1990.
13closely, the industry pattern seen in Figure 2. Here I present a formal labor productivity growth
decomposition for the industry. Denote mine and industry labor productivity by πit = yit/nit and




nit, respectively, where yit is tons of pellets produced and nit is hours worked
at mine i. Industry productivity can be expressed as a weighted average of πit, Πt ≡
P
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where ∆ is the diﬀerence operator (that is, ∆Πt,t0 = Πt0 −Πt), Ct,t0 is the set of mines that operated
in t and t0 (continuing mines), Et,t0 is the set that operated in t0 and not t (entering mines), and Xt,t0
is the set that operated in t and not t0 (exiting mines). There are ﬁve terms in the decomposition. Let
termj refer to the jth term. The ﬁrst term is the increase in industry productivity from continuing
mines increasing their productivity at initial hours (the within-mine term). The second term is the
increase in productivity resulting from continuing mines with above-average productivity expanding
their share of hours relative to below-average productivity mines (the between-mine term). The
third term is the cross-mine term. The fourth term is the increase in productivity due to exits. The
ﬁfth term is the increase due to entrants (which is zero since there are no entrants).
Table 2 gives information on the decomposition between the base year t =1 9 8 0and years
t0 ∈ {1981,...,1995}.T h eﬁrst column reports the percentage industry productivity gain between
t and t0,t h a ti s ,∆Π
Π × 100, while columns two through ﬁve present the share of the percentage
productivity gains due to terms j =1 ,2,3,4, respectively, that is,
termj
∆Π × 100.T a b l e2s h o w st h a t
productivity gains due to closing mines were small, never contributing more than 7 percent of the
gains and most often nothing.28 The major source of industry productivity gains was within-mine
28Note that the ﬁrst mine to close, Butler, closed in 1986, and in that year closing mines contributed nothing to
growth. That is because Butler’s labor productivity was very close to the industry average in the base year 1980
14gains, this term never accounting for less than 73 percent of the gains. While the cross-mine and
between-mine terms accounted for some gains, from 1990 onward the within-mine gains accounted
f o ro v e r9 0p e r c e n to ft h eg a i n s .
B. Gains From Reducing Scale at Continuing Mines?
Perhaps changes in the scale of production at individual mines increased Yt/Nt, Yt/Mt, and/or
Yt/Kt. By reducing their scale of operation, mines may have increased productivity by, for example,
exploiting the best deposits at the mine, leaving marginal deposits unused.29 A review of mine level
data, again from the Minnesota pellet industry, shows that for most mines that remained open,
output in the late 1980s was not less than 1980 levels. (See Figure 7.) It was less only at Reserve
and Eveleth (and not much less at Eveleth). Reductions in scale were not a source of productivity
gains.
C. New Technology?
There were no major technological changes in the iron ore industry in the 1980s.30 There
were minor improvements in technology, to be sure, but these contributed only modestly to the
productivity gains.
There were certainly lots of minor improvements in technology. Take the Minnesota pellet
industry. In the pit where crude ore was mined, there were improvements in blasting techniques.
Computers began to be used in dispatching trucks to transport crude ore to the mills for processing.
and because it was a small mine as well. Reserve closed in 1987 and reopened in 1990, when the contribution again
returned to zero.
29There can be productivity gains, of course, from scaling back production in anticipation that it might cease
altogether in a few years. But I am considering the possibility of increasing productivity by reducing output to a new,
“permanent” level, and that is why I examine production levels toward the end of the decade. For example, as the
crisis began, mines cut back on long-term, preventive maintenance. They also reduced their stripping and clearing
operations in the pit. There was little need to prepare new ﬁelds for mining of crude ore. Both these changes would
lead to increases in productivity but only for a few years. Clearly, repair and stripping would have to resume to
previous levels if the mine survived.
30I know there was no major technological change from my study of the industry. But some readers may be interested
to know that during the 1980s the world’s two leading iron ore producers, Australia and Brazil, experienced very few
gains in labor productivity. There clearly was no general technological improvement in the iron ore industry spreading
through the world.
15In the mills, grinding processes were improved. Methods were developed to recycle heat that was
used to agglomerate the pellets. To make a better pellet, one that required less coke in the blast
furnace, mines began to add limestone to the pellet and to experiment with bonding agents to
replace bentonite.31 In previous versions of this paper, I took particular improvements and argued
that their impact on productivity was small. In fact, the last two improvements mentioned above
would have led to lower productivity (in terms of tons per hour or tons per unit of material), though
a better product. But it would not be practical for me to learn all the small improvements made at
the mines (and then attempt to assess their importance together).
I can, however, make two important points about technology (in addition to the fact that there
was no major change). First, whatever marginal improvements were made, they were done on the
cheap. For example, much new technology is typically embodied in new equipment. New investment
spending (relative to gross output) was at all-time lows in both the United States and Canada
during the 1980s.32 Not surprisingly, these industries were very cautious about new investment in
the 1980s.33
Second, it’s of interest to compare technology improvement in these iron ore industries with
that in the U.S. steel industry. There is no doubt that the pace of technological change in the
U.S. steel industry in the 1980s was much greater than that in these iron ore industries.34 Yet
the U.S. steel industry could not match their labor productivity gains. Labor productivity gains
31See “Taconite Industry Back on Its Feet for Now,” Minneapolis Star Tribune, May 14, 1988.
32For Canada, I have new investment relative to gross output by year over time. For the United States, I can
only calculate this quantity at ﬁve-year intervals (when the CMI is available). It is well known that there is large
year-to-year variation in investment in industries, so the U.S. data are subject to this caveat, yet it seems pretty clear
that the 1980s was a period of very low investment relative to revenue.
33Interviews in the Wall Street Journal with managers of Minnesota pellet mines corroborate this weak investment
spending. (See, for example, “US Basic Industry’s Health Improves – Reviving Iron Ore Firm Sends Another Fragile
Sign,” Wall Street Journal, June 9, 1989.) The manager of the Eveleth mine states that “we’re hesitant to buy new
equipment because of uncertainty about ore demand.”
34For example, among U.S. integrated-steel producers, the fraction of steel that was continuously cast soared from
20.3 to 67.4 percent of production over the decade. Continuous casting was a major improvement over previous
methods. On the “low” end of the steel market, minimills dramatically increased their share of the market. Minimill
technology was also a dramatic improvement over previous methods. The steel industry clearly had much more
signiﬁcant improvements in technology than the iron ore industries.
16were 103 and 63 percent in the U.S. iron ore and steel industries, respectively.35 In line with this
paper’s theme, while the U.S. steel industry was badly battered in the 1980s, there was no doubt
the industry would survive in some form. The same was not true of iron ore.
D. Increases in Skill?
A large increase in the average skill of the workforce would increase Yt/Nt, Yt/Mt,a n dYt/Kt.
Statistics Canada has developed measures of quality-adjusted labor input by industry. In classifying
workers by type, it uses seven age and four education groupings. Quality-adjusted labor input for
the iron ore industry fell less in the 1980s than total hours worked, but the diﬀerences were small.
From 1981 to 1990, quality-adjusted labor input fell 43 percent and hours worked fell 46 percent.
So, on the basis of this information, there does not seem to have been much increase in the average
quality or skill of workers.36
E. Increase in the Price of Labor Relative to Other Inputs?
So far, I have considered conventional factors that may have increased Yt/Nt, Yt/Mt, and/or
Yt/Kt. Now, I want to focus on factors that may have increased Yt/Nt. According to the calcula-
tions above, increases in materials per hour and capital per hour were only minor sources of labor
productivity gain. (See Table 1 and Figure 6.) In the next two sections, I still want to show that
conventional factors had little to do with these increases. In this section I consider the possibility
that mine labor had become expensive relative to other inputs, thereby leading to substitution to-
ward these inputs and, hence, increasing the materials-labor and capital-labor ratios. There is no
evidence that this was the case.
Consider ﬁrst the price of labor relative to the price of new capital, pN/pK,w h i c hIp l o t
in Figure 8, together with the capital-labor ratio, K/N. From 1972 to 1980, the price of labor
35These are productivity gains in 1980—88, in the BLS publication, “Productivity Measures for Selected Industries
and Government Services,” Bulletin 2406, April 1992.
36It is also important to keep in mind that seniority provisions in union contracts had a large inﬂuence on who lost
jobs at mines. Management could not freely choose who left and who stayed.
17increased about one-third relative to the price of capital. During the 1980s, pN/pK increased much
less slowly. While K/N was relatively ﬂat in the 1970s, it soared in the 1980s.37 It seems that the
large increase in the capital-labor ratio during the 1980s cannot be explained by a dramatic increase
in the price of labor relative to capital.
Consider materials next. I have time series data on price and usage of electricity in Canada.
Electricity is a large share of materials in these industries. In Figure 9, I plot the price of labor
relative to the price of electricity, pN/pE, and the electricity-labor ratio, E/N, for Canada. There
i sn ot r e n di nt h er e l a t i v ep r i c epN/pE over the 1972—90 period. But there was a large increase in
the electricity-labor ratio during the 1980s. Again, it seems that this increase cannot be explained
by a dramatic increase in pN/pE.38
F. Changes in Restrictions on Purchasing Inputs?
The discussion in the preceding section implicitly assumes that mines were free to purchase
inputs. This was not true. Mines faced restrictions in two materials categories: repair parts and
contracting out services. As a result of the crisis, some restrictions were eased. The loosening of
restrictions likely was responsible for a part of the increase in the materials-labor ratio, but only a
small part.
New union contract provisions allowed mines greater freedom in purchasing repair parts
that previously were manufactured in-house. This was sometimes referred to as the shelf-item
procedure. It was a new provision whereby if a repair part could be found on a shelf, it could be
37Two items are important to discuss. First, the price pK is the price of new capital and not a measure of the user
cost of capital, which I would prefer (but is not available). Second, the time series for both pN/pK and K/N had
“spikes” in 1978. The spikes were due to transitory, and unrelated, occurrences. Regarding the K/N time series, there
was a strike that year that led to low hours worked N and hence a high K/N. Regarding pN/pK,t h ep r i c eo fl a b o r
used in Figure 8 is compensation per hour (which includes wages and fringes). It increased 40 percent between 1977
and 1978, then fell 13 percent between 1978 and 1979. Over the same years, wages per hour for production workers
increased 9 percent and 12 percent. So, clearly something unusual happened to fringe payments in 1978 to make pN
soar.
38There are again “spikes” in both time series in 1978. Again, the spike in the relative price is due to something
unusual happening with fringe payments in 1978. I am not sure about the spike in E/N.N o t et h a tE/N increased a
bit more than M/N. (See discussion below.)
18purchased.39 Other new contract provisions also allowed a limited increase in purchasing services of
oﬀ-site contractors for repair.
According to the CMI, repair parts and contracting out were a small share of materials
spending in 1982, amounting to 6.4 and 2.9 percent of materials, respectively.40 Between 1982 and
1987 (the period in which these restrictions were eased), repair parts and contracting out increased
to 8.0 and 5.6 percent of materials spending, respectively. But the increase in (real) repair parts and
(real) contracting out as a share of (real) materials spending was likely much smaller. Electricity
and fuel amounted to 55.8 percent of materials spending in 1982. Electricity and fuel prices fell
signiﬁcantly between 1982 and 1987. Repair parts prices likely increased. Shelf-items were parts
that were for sale generally; thus, their prices likely increased. I’m safe, I think, in concluding that
changes in contract provisions did not lead to surges in purchases of materials that previously were
oﬀ limits.41
I am exploring, of course, the impacts of loosening contract restrictions on increases in ma-
terials per hour and not simply materials. Perhaps hours spent assembling repair parts fell a lot.
Suppose after the loosening that a mine could now purchase a particular assembled repair part oﬀ
the shelf for x dollars. Before it purchased unassembled parts and assembled them on-site. Suppose
the unassembled parts cost y dollars, the wages paid to employees assembling the parts w dollars
and the depreciation for the machines and tools used in the assembly d dollars. The cost of purchase
and assembly was y + w + d. Let me assume that y + w + d was not much bigger than x (that is,
assembling on-site wasn’t too ineﬃcient). Since x was not much bigger than y (that is, the increase
in repair part purchases at the mines was small; in particular, it increased from $42 million to $48
39As an example of the contract language, here is an excerpt from the Inland/Minorca mine’s BLA (August 1, 1986,
p. 117): “The Company may purchase standard components or parts or supply items, mass produced for sale generally
(‘shelf items’). No item shall be deemed a standard component or part or supply item if its fabrication requires the
use of prints, sketches or manufacturing instructions supplied by the company or at its behest or it is otherwise made
according to Company speciﬁcations.”
40See Appendix B for information on U.S. materials spending.
41The increase in spending on repair parts and contracting out were not large because (1) the loosening of restrictions
was not great, but perhaps more importantly (2) changes in work practices led to more eﬃcient work on site.
19million between 1982 and 1987), which implies that w+d is small. If w+d is small, then the number
of employees losing jobs is small.42
My assumption could be wrong: assembly on-site could have been ineﬃcient. That is, y+w+d
m a yh a v eb e e nm u c hl a r g e rt h a nx. Maybe lots of employees lost jobs assembling repair parts. In
this case, I would need to assign more credit to the easing of contract restrictions in increasing
materials per hour. But if there were huge ineﬃciencies, mine work practices were likely the culprit.
T h es t o r yw o u l db et h es a m e .
I have now explored the contribution of a long list of conventional sources of productivity
gain. The conclusion is that these conventional factors contributed only modestly to the surge in
productivity in the U.S. and Canadian iron ore industries.
5. Work Practices and Productivity: Theory
Here I develop a simple framework to show how restrictive work practices impact productivity.
Work practices are restrictions on how ﬁrms can use inputs. For example, work practices
might require that machines be manned by at least a certain number of workers. A famous case of
such a practice involved the requirement that diesel trains carry ﬁremen.43
I nt h ei r o no r ei n d u s t r i e s ,w o r kp r a c t i c e si m p o s e das h a r ps e p a r a t i o no fm a i n t e n a n c ea n d
repair work from production work. Machine operators (production workers) were precluded from
setting up their machines, like picking up small supplies and parts incidental to the job. They did
not maintain their machines, like tightening nuts and bolts, or replacing fuses, wiper blades, tires,
bulbs, batteries and ﬂuids, or jump starting vehicles. They were not involved in repair, like helping
repair staﬀ when they were called. After the crisis, machine operators became involved in many of
these tasks.44
42For a more formal statement showing this implies the number of job losses is small, see the January 2004 working
paper.
43When diesel locomotives replaced steam ones, train crews (that is, ﬁremen) were no longer needed to shovel coal
into steam engines. But ﬁremen remained on diesels for decades.
44A lengthy discussion of changes in these work practices can be found in the Basic Labor Agreement (July 1, 1994,
20Work practices also assigned repair staﬀ to a job category or classiﬁcation. A person with
a given classiﬁcation completed repair jobs assigned to this classiﬁcation but not others. After the
crisis, repair workers engaged in a wider range of repairs. New jobs were created that rolled a large
number of previous repair jobs into a single new combined job. An ironworker was to perform the
duties that were previously done by boilermakers, riggers, and welders. A millwright’s duties were to
include those previously assigned to plumbers, pipeﬁtters, welders, and mechanics. In some mines,
the number of repair job categories fell from the upper 20s to the low single digits.45
The iron ore industry work practices described above share the overstaﬃng feature of the
ﬁreman case. That is, maintenance and repair staﬀ were employed to complete tasks that machine
operators could do. Also, having many repair job categories led to a lack of ﬂexibility in assignment
and to overstaﬃng as well. But they have a very diﬀerent feature. These work practices slow the
system down. By having machine operators wait for maintenance and repair staﬀ, machinery stays
in nonproduction mode longer. By having a welder, for example, wait for a pipeﬁtter to complete
ap i p e ﬁtter task that the welder could accomplish, machinery again stays in nonproduction mode
longer.
Hence, loosening restrictive work practices in the iron ore case increases labor productivity
for two reasons: it leads to less staﬀ but it also increases output as the mine’s machines run more
continuously.46 Having machines run more continuously obviously increases capital productivity. It
also increases materials productivity. This is because many mine machines are not shut down as
pp. 158—60) between the USW and the National Steel Pellet Mine.
45Another work practice was that tools were designated to be used by certain workers; they were oﬀ limits to others.
Some tools that were thus designated included chain saws, hammer drills, hoses, screwdrivers, hammers, air tools,
magnetic drills, and paint and painting supplies and equipment. Other work practices that changed were where breaks
would be taken, how much wash-up time was allowed, and how vacations could be structured.
46Below I will present a few more examples of work practices that slowed the mines down. But here let me give an
example from the U.S. Class I railroad industry. A story was broadcast on NPR’s Weekend Edition, June 16, 2002,
about U.S. “short line” railroads. The train engineer (for such a railroad) in the story uses a chainsaw (from his cab)
to clear a tree on the track in front of his train. It’s mentioned that engineers are not allowed to perform such duties
in Class I railroads. Other staﬀ w o u l dh a v et ob ec a l l e dt oc l e a rt h et r e e . T h e“ o t h e r ”s t a ﬀ time used to travel to
the site (and then back to wherever they were) is obviously wasted time and leads to overstaﬃng. But probably more
important, the train is delayed a certain some number of hours. “Output” over the day is less as a result.
21others are repaired. Hence, fuel and other materials are consumed even when output is not being
produced.
These ideas can be presented more formally. Doing so allows me, among other things, to
show that changes in work practices can produce time series like that in Figure 6. To save on space,
I present this more formal analysis in Appendix C.
6. Changes in Work Practices Play a Large Role in Productivity Gains
In this section I provide direct evidence that changes in work practices were important sources
of the gains in Yt/Nt, Yt/Mt,a n dYt/Kt.
A .C h a n g e si nW o r kP r a c t i c e sa n dL a b o rP r o d u c t i v i t y
Changes in work practices increased Yt/Nt through two channels: less overstaﬃng and greater
output (from greater mine speed). The ﬁrst two subsections below present information on over-
staﬃng. The next two subsections present information on overstaﬃng and mine speed jointly.
Though overstaﬃng likely occurred in all jobs, the work practice changes were to impact the
repair staﬀ most. Repair staﬀs were a large share of employment in these industries before the crisis.
In Minnesota, repair staﬀs accounted for 50 to 55 percent of total hours at Minntac, 52.5 percent at
Inland/Minorca, and 46.5 percent at Eveleth.47 So, the overstaﬃng problem could have been large.
The next two subsections show it was.
Mine studies on work practice changes. In the middle 1980s, as part of the process of bar-
gaining over work rule changes, some mines completed studies to estimate the impact of changing
repair work rules. In particular, Minntac estimated that for every ﬁve machine operators that were
made equipment tenders, the repair staﬀ could be reduced by two.48 This is a large expected impact
47The Minntac data (discussed below) are from the St. Louis County mine inspector. The evidence on the Inland/
Minorca and Eveleth mines is from Learmont (1983). The data for Minorca are from 1983; Learmont doesn’t specify
the year for Eveleth, other than that it is in the early 1980s. Minntac’s repair hours (as a fraction of the total) fell
s h a r p l yi nt h ee a r l y1 9 8 0 s ,s ot h e s eﬁgures for Minorca and Eveleth (which are a year or two into the crisis) may
understate their repair staﬀs prior to the crisis.
48An equipment tender was a machine operator who was permitted to maintain and conduct simple repairs on
22on repair employment per equipment tender position.49 It’s important to note the context in which
this study was made. The local union and management at Minntac had agreed in principle to reduce
the workforce a given amount through loosening work rules. The company then drafted changes
in work rules and made estimates of how many jobs would be lost from implementing them. The
company obviously had an incentive to underestimate the expected job losses. That this was the
case is clear in the Arbitrators Award where the union argued that the company had underestimated
the job losses.
Minntac’s repair time series. Repair staﬀs fell disproportionally during the crisis. My best
evidence comes from the path of repair hours relative to total hours at the Minntac mine in Min-
nesota. Fortunately, in reporting hours to safety oﬃcials, Minntac reported total hours and hours
by three (exhaustive) groups: hours in the pit (nonrepair), in the mill (again, nonrepair), and by
repair staﬀ. I plot the share of repair hours in Figure 10. One can see that repair hours (as a
percentage of total) fell sharply at Minntac during the crisis. The share was approximately 50 to
55 percent before the crisis; after the crisis, it was approximately 28 percent.50 The reduction in
repair staﬀ accounted for a large share of employment reduction, well over 75 percent of the total.
Mine variation in work practices: Minnesota. Other evidence on the impact of changes in
work practices on Yt/Nt is found in variations in work practices within and across mines. This
provides information on overstaﬃng and speed together.
As I mentioned, one Minnesota mine (Reserve/Northshore) actually changed union status
over the 1980s. This mine almost certainly had a greater loosening of restrictive work practices
machines. Details concerning this Minntac study can be found in the Arbitration Award that ruled on various aspects
of the work rule changes introduced at Minntac. The arbitrator (representing the National Board of Arbitration) was
Shyam Das, currently the arbitrator for Major League Baseball.
49It is interesting to note that equipment tenders were discussed as possible sources of large productivity gains in
other industries, like the auto industry, that were undergoing work rule changes in the 1980s. For example, Luria
(1986) notes that while studies had not been done to assess the eﬀect of work rule changes in the auto industry, “the
most sizable cost reductions will probably come from the broadening of job descriptions to enable production workers
to set up and maintain their own equipment” (p. 24).
50Minntac stopped reporting hours by location to the mine inspectors for a few years during the crisis (though total
hours were still reported). That is why there is a “gap” in Figure 10.
23than the other mines (which remained union). It’s of interest, then, to compare the evolution of
Reserve’s productivity to that of the others. Turning to Figure 7, one can see that a few years
after its reopening in 1990, Reserve had productivity levels relative to 1980 that were substantially
higher than the other continuing mines. After reopening, Reserve’s productivity was a factor of four
greater than that of its 1980 level, whereas the other mines had productivity levels that were three
times or less higher in the early 1990s as compared to 1980.51
Comparing work practice changes across the union mines is diﬃc u l t .A sIm e n t i o n e di nt h e
introduction, the crisis led to a thawing of labor-management relations and to voluntary changes
in work practices.52 Work practice changes were driven by these voluntary changes and by formal
contract changes (covering proﬁt-sharing, labor-management cooperation teams, and work rules).
So, I am left with the problem of how to measure the voluntary changes that took place (that are,
by deﬁnition, not recorded and not measured).53 Given this diﬃculty, I am not be able to rank
union mines by overall changes in work practices.54
That said, I would be remiss in not mentioning that Minntac clearly was the mine that most
aggressively introduced work rule changes in the 1980s and had the greatest productivity growth.
(See Figure 7.)55 Also, the National mine, after surviving the 1980s, was again threatened with
closure in 1993. New owners bought the mine that year under the condition that there again be
51Reserve was going through major court battles on environmental issues in the late 1970s, which may have inﬂuenced
its productivity. Hence, it’s also of interest to look at its productivity in the early 1970s relative to other mines and
then again in the early 1990s. The same ﬁnding holds: Reserve’s productivity relative to other mines was higher in
the early 1990s than in the early 1970s.
52For a story about worker cooperation in productivity improvements, see, for example, “Iron Ore Industry’s Best
Eﬀorts Fail to Halt Its Decline,” Wall Street Journal, November 19, 1986.
53Mines may have diﬀered on the extent of voluntary changes because of diﬀerences in the age distribution of the
work force or other factors.
54As a corollary, I cannot say which formal contract changes (for example, work rule changes, proﬁts h a r i n g )w e r e
most important in loosening restrictive work practices. For a study comparing the importance of various formal
contract provisions, see Ichniowski et al. (1997).
55Minntac’s work rule changes during the 1980s were far more sweeping than at any other Minnesota mine. The
February 1, 1987, BLA between Minntac and the USW contained an “Employee Protection/Job Realignment Agree-
ment” section that stated in part: “The Company shall have a one-time opportunity to reman each aﬀected facility,
to be completed by June 30, 1987, including crew composition changes, job realignments and a deﬁnition of new jobs
and seniority units necessary to achieve the objectives and commitments of this Agreement.” No other mine contract
in the 1980s had this type of language on work rule changes.
24changes in work rules. The surge in National’s productivity in 1993—94 was a direct result of these
work rule changes.56 The National case also illustrates that labor-management cooperation was far
from ideal in the 1980s and that there was still plenty of room for productivity improvements.
Mine variations in work practices: Robe River. I next consider the impact of changes in
work practices in an Australian iron ore mine, Robe River. In a well-known (in Australia) episode,
restrictive work practices were abruptly eliminated at Robe River when new owners replaced senior
management of this mine. The Australian industry was not in crisis, but rather the new owners
challenged status quo work practices. (No other Australian mine did so for many more years.) This
episode diﬀers from the U.S. and Canadian one in the abruptness of the changes (making it easier to
isolate the impact of the changes), and also in that the new senior management has written about
their experiences.57
The production and labor productivity records of Robe River are given in Figure 11. Data are
on a ﬁscal year basis. In contrast to the U.S. and Canadian mines, there was no drop in production in
the early 1980s: Australian mines were not in crisis in this period. New owners abruptly announced
new work practices on July 31, 1986. The changes were met with resistance by union management
and regional government. The small fall in output from 1985—86 to 1986—87 reﬂects periods when the
mine was shut down due to resistance. New management prevailed on most counts in a few months.
Production increased by about 75 percent in the next ﬁve years. Labor productivity tripled.
56Commenting on the dramatic increase in National’s productivity in 1993—94, Peter Kakela, the leading industry
analyst of the Minnesota iron ore industry, said much of the productivity gains came from “simply eliminating people
and simply expecting more from the people who were left.” (See the article on National Steel in Corporate Report
Minnesota, September 1996, p. 56.)
57In particular, Charles Copeman, the new general manager at the mine, has written “The Robe River Aﬀair” and
“Robe River Revisited,” both found on the HR Nicholls Web site. Copeman writes about his experiences because
the removal of restrictive work practices was not only unique in the Australian iron ore industry but in Australian
industry generally. As he says, “The shock waves reverberated around Australia.” In contrast, work practice changes
were occurring not only throughout the U.S. and Canadian iron ore industries, but in many U.S. and Canadian
manufacturing industries as well.
25B. Changes in Work Practices and Materials and Capital Productivity
When mines are in a nonproduction mode because of breakdowns or stalls in machinery,
capital sits idle and materials are still consumed. As a result, changes in work practices that allow
mines to run more continuously lead to increases in Yt/Kt and Yt/Mt.
That having machines run more continuously increases Yt/Kt is obvious. It would increase
Yt/Mt if when machines were being repaired, the mines still consumed signiﬁcant amounts of ma-
terials. Hence, I start in the ﬁrst subsection by arguing that mines indeed do consume a large
amount of materials in these situations. Then in the following two subsections I present evidence
that changes in work practices did increase the speed of mines and, hence, Yt/Kt and Yt/Mt.
Materials consumed when mines are not operating. A big issue is whether to run machinery
when other machinery must be repaired. One issue in deciding to shut machinery down is whether
this will save on energy costs. For some machines, energy costs are not saved if machines are shut
down for short periods. In pellet mines, furnaces that agglomerate the iron ore are heated to 3,000◦F.
Shutting these furnaces down for short periods clearly does not save on energy costs. The fuel to
drive these furnaces accounted for 13 percent of U.S. materials consumption in 1982. (See Appendix
B.) The diesel trucks that transport ore from the pit to the mill are also typically not shut down
for short periods. (Diesel was about 5 percent of materials.) Hence, if mines are in nonproduction
mode because some machines need to be repaired, a substantial amount of materials in the form of
fuel (in the furnaces and trucks) is still consumed.
Some machinery may be shut down for short periods, like those using electricity generated
with someone else’s furnace.58 Hence, when restrictive work practices were loosened, one might
expect tons per unit of furnace fuel and tons per unit of diesel to increase, yet there to be no
increase in tons per unit of electricity. This was, in fact, the pattern in both the U.S. and Canadian
58This is eﬃcient if the electric power generating companies can “smooth” the use of electric power. The mines
were typically very large customers of the power companies, and so this put limits on how well the companies could
smooth power demand.
26industries in the 1980s. (See Appendix B.)
More materials than simply fuel are consumed when mines are in nonproduction mode. For
machines that are shut down, this process may lead to increased wear and tear on the machinery.
Machinery not shut down consumes materials other than fuel. The furnaces running at these extreme
temperatures are continually depreciating and in need of maintenance. There is also depreciation
of structures that occurs through time (independent of use), which requires materials to ﬁx.
There are still other materials consumed when output is not produced. For example, materials
are consumed by the oﬃces at the mines. Materials are used in the manufacturing of pellets (like
c h e m i c a l su s e di ns e p a r a t i n gi r o na n db o n d i n ga g e n t su s e di nb a k i n gp e l l e t s ) ,a n di ft h ep r o c e s si s
interrupted, these may be wasted.
Language in union contracts/arbitration awards. Having machines run more continuously
was recognized as an important goal of work rule changes. For example, consider this excerpt from
a section introducing new work rules in the National Pellet Mine’s Basic Labor Agreement with
the USW: “The parties recognize that most mining equipment is in a non-production mode for a
signiﬁcant amount of time each day. Minimizing this lost time is essential to improve productivity
....” (p. 170).
A n o t h e rw o r kp r a c t i c e( n o td i s c u s s e da b o v e )t h a tr e d u c e dt h es p e e do ft h em i n ew a sm i n e
equipment relief practices. Before the crisis, changes in work shifts occurred at the “dry,” located
at a ﬁxed point in the mine. Management requested that relief practices be changed to “eyeball-
to-eyeball,” that is, at the equipment.59 Machines would then not stand idle for the time it took to
travel to and back from the dry (perhaps as much as 15 to 30 minutes or longer of an eight-hour
shift). The union at Minntac opposed the change in relief practices, but the arbitrator sided with
management noting that “the alternate proposal by the Union ... would result in less production
59For example, before the crisis, a small van would drive to a mining truck, pick up its current driver, return him
or her to the “dry,” pick up the new driver, and return him or her to the idling truck. Under eyeball-to-eyeball relief,
the new driver is brought to the truck when the old driver is replaced.
27than under the Company’s proposal.”
Robe River again. As mentioned, the new management at Robe River discussed the impact
of changes in work practices. They emphasized large improvements in Yt/Kt and Yt/Mt following
the changes. They argued that changes in work practices meant that “with better working methods
the existing equipment could give the production levels needed, and that the move to a new mine
site could be delayed,” so that “huge savings have been made in capital expenditure, as well as in
operating [materials] costs.”60
7. Conclusion
Following a dramatic increase in foreign competition in the early 1980s, the U.S. and Canadian
iron ore industries both signiﬁcantly increased labor, materials, and capital productivity. Conven-
tional factors like closing of low productivity mines and adopting new technology account for only
a small part of these productivity gains. Instead, changes in work practices drove the bulk of the
productivity increases.
The work practices studied here are by no means peculiar to iron ore. They exist to varying
degrees throughout many U.S. manufacturing, transportation, and other industries. And when
competition has intensiﬁed in these industries, restrictive work practices have been loosened. What
is peculiar to iron ore is that the entire industry was severely threatened. The U.S. auto industry, for
example, experienced increased competitive pressure in the early 1980s, though only some segments
were hit. These segments did change work practices somewhat.61 The U.S. Class I railroad industry
experienced both truck and train deregulation in the 1980s. However, there has been little loosening
of restrictive work practices in this industry, suggesting that the increase in competitive pressure
was not that great.
60These two quotes are from “Robe River Revisited” and “Robe River Aﬀair,” respectively.
61Luria (1986) says, “The pressures for change are clearly uneven. Restrictive work rules and narrow classiﬁcations
have lasted longer in those sectors of the industry that can best withstand foreign competition and outsourcing
competition – for example, in plants that assemble large cars and trucks ...” (p. 24).
28Prescott (1998) talks about the need for developing a theory of TFP.62 This paper, I think,
has made some progress in this endeavor: I have shown increases in competition (or decreases in
tariﬀs) led to surges in TFP through changes in restrictive work practices. This naturally leads to
the question, Why were restrictive work practices not changed before the crisis in iron ore? And why
do they persist today in nearly full force in Class I railroads? Let me start with a straw man. This
straw man says these work practices were part of a rent package received by workers. In this view,
work practices led to idle time that was valued by the workers. In other words, workers used some
of their rents to purchase idle time and other nonpecuniary beneﬁts. With increased competition,
rents were destroyed; hence, work practices had to be changed.
But this view is vastly incomplete, if there’s much truth to it at all. If it was idle time
workers wanted, why structure work practices so that machinery sat idle as well? With machinery
idle, capital productivity and materials productivity suﬀer. Work practices clearly led to money
being ﬂushed down the toilet. I can’t say this loud enough. Hence, there are other reasons these
work practices were not changed before the crisis.
What are these other reasons? I mention two possibilities. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to do more. Money can obviously be made by changing such work practices. But there may
be disagreements among groups (for example, workers vs. local managers, repair workers vs. other
workers) about how to divide the money. And, of course, there may be commitment problems.
Can groups be assured that agreements will be honored? Also, might an “outside” group, like the
local towns, say, through increased taxation, attempt to capture some of the gains? Many steel
companies today, in fact, are trying to dump pension obligations made to early retirees in the 1980s.
Of course, whatever the reason work practices were not changed, with competition, it may no longer
be possible to ﬂush money down the toilet and survive (as was the case here), and restrictive work
62See also Caselli and Coleman (2000), Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (1997), Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (1997),
Kocherlakota (2001), and Parente and Prescott (1999).
29practices must be changed.
30Appendix A: Data Sources and Discussion
In this appendix, I present sources of data and discuss data issues not addressed in the paper.
Pig iron statistics (used in Figure 1) are from the Minerals Yearbook of the United States
(various issues), United States Geological Survey (USGS).
For the Minnesota pellet industry, production data (in tons) by mine are from the Minnesota
Department of Revenue. Hours data for a mine are from the mine inspectors in each Minnesota
county where mines are located (primarily St. Louis County). Some mines have operations in two
counties (the pit and the mill can be in separate counties), so for these mines, hours ﬁgures are
combined. These tons and hours statistics are used in Figures 2, 7, and 10, and Table 2. For the
entire U.S. iron ore industry, production (in tons) and hours worked (used in Figure 3) are from
the Minerals Yearbook of the United States. The U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) publishes a productivity series (“Productivity Measures for Selected Industries
and Government Services,” Bulletin 2406, April 1992) where output is revenue divided by a price
deﬂator. The BLS productivity series looks very much like the Minerals Yearbook series. For the
Canadian industry, I have production (in tons) from Natural Resources Canada (NRC) for 1970—97.
Statistics Canada has a deﬂated industry revenue series for 1981—97. For my measure of gross output
in Figure 4, I used tons produced from 1970 to 1981 and then deﬂated industry revenue from 1981
to 1997. From 1981 onward, deﬂated industry revenue falls a bit less than tons produced (since
pellets, the highest-quality ore, increase as a share of output in the 1980s). Hours worked (used in
Figure 4) are from Statistics Canada.
Statistics Canada has time series for real capital stock, real capital services, and real materials
purchases. The latter two series (used in Figure 5) run from 1981 to 1997. Wulong Gu provided this
information. Input’s share of revenues (used in Figure 6 and Table 1) is from Statistics Canada. I
have used capital services in constructing TFP. Capital services falls 14 percent between 1981 and
1988. The capital stock calculated using geometric depreciation falls 29 percent between 1981 and
311988. So, the increase in TFP would obviously have been more signiﬁcant using the latter series.
Price of new capital, price of labor (that is, compensation per hour), and capital stock (used in
Figure 8) are from Statistics Canada. Usage and price of electricity (used in Figure 9) are from
NRC. The data for Robe River are from Robe River Associates.
An issue not discussed in the paper is the extent to which mine workers produce output that
is distinct from iron ore. In particular, some mines during the 1960s and 1970s generated some of
their own electricity. Self-generated electricity was always a small share of total electricity use; its
share fell throughout the 1970s, so that by the 1980s all electricity was purchased. Let YE and YI
denote the (real) gross output of electricity generated and iron produced at the mines, respectively,
and NE and NI the hours worked in electricity generation and iron ore production. I have presented
information on YI/(NE +NI). Data on self-generated electricity YE are available in the U.S. Census
of Mineral Industries at ﬁve-year intervals, but data on NE are not. Presumably, NE went to zero as
YE did. If I had data on NE, and hence could plot YI/NI, Figures 2 and 3, say, would look as follows.
Productivity in the early 1970s would be a little “higher” than currently and would decrease a bit
through the 1970s. The 1980s would be unchanged. This same logic applies to any construction
a c t i v i t yt h a tw a so c c u r r i n ga tt h em i n e sw h e r em i n es t a ﬀ were involved. That is, construction was
happening in the 1970s and not the 1980s. This activity was scaled back in the 1970s.
Appendix B: Materials Usage in the U.S. Iron Ore Industry
The lowest level of aggregation in which a (real) materials series is constructed is the metal
mines industry. Still, the Census of Mineral Industries provides an extensive accounting of materials
usage in the iron ore industry every ﬁve years. Materials spending in the CMI is the sum of
(1) electricity and fuel, (2) supplies, and (3) contracting out. Table B1 shows the spending on
materials in the U.S. industry by these three groups (and some breakdown within groups) in 1982
and 1987. Electricity and fuel, supplies, and contracting out amounted to 55.8, 41.3, and 2.9 percent
of materials, respectively, in 1982. The same shares in 1987 were 53.7, 40.7, and 5.6 percent. So,
32there was only a small change in the share of materials spending among these three groups.
In addition to the spending on materials, the CMI also gives the quantity of materials pur-
chased for (essentially) each material in the electricity and fuel group, plus a few in the supplies
group (explosives, bentonite, and so on). Between 1982 and 1987, the CMI reports that tons of iron
ore produced increased 45 percent. In the electricity and fuel group, the quantity of fuel for vehicles
(primarily diesel) fell over 15 percent between 1982 and 1987. The quantity of fuel for furnaces
increased only slightly (about 3 percent). Hence, tons per unit of both fuels soared. Electricity
usage actually increased a bit faster than tons from 1982 to 1987; hence, there was a small decrease
in tons per unit of electricity. These same patterns are found in Canada during the 1980s. To esti-
mate real materials growth between 1982 and 1987, I need to make assumptions about how prices
of supplies changed between the dates. Recall that I have quantities for electricity and fuel. Under
the assumption that there were no price changes for supplies between these dates, I estimate that
U.S. materials productivity (Y/M) increased 23 percent. Details on this calculation, and Table B1’s
construction, are available from me.
Appendix C: Work Practices and Productivity: Theory
Here I brieﬂy sketch the arguments of Section 5 more formally.
Consider the ﬁreman case. Let the number of ﬁremen and other railroad workers be denoted
by nf and np (“p” for production). Total employment is n = np + nf. Work practices require that
nf ≥ λ (where λ is typically one). Production can then be modeled as
y = A(np)θnmθmkθk
if nf ≥ λ,a n dy =0if nf <λ(that is, the train isn’t permitted to run). Note that only np enters






















where n = np + λ. Suppose the work practice is loosened, that is, λ falls. Here it seems reasonable
33to assume that the railroad would make no changes in other inputs (np,m,k). Labor productivity
increases. Materials productivity doesn’t change.
Consider a model of the iron ore case. Take a given time period, say, a week, and divide it into
L equal subperiods, say, hours. Suppose mine inputs over a subperiod are denoted (e nr, e np, e m, e k),
where e nr and e np are repair and production worker hours, respectively. Mines are either in operating
mode in a subperiod, with output e y = e Af(e np, e m, e k), where f(·)=F(·) as in equation (2), or
because of breakdowns, in non-operating mode, with no output produced. Suppose that a mine
cannot change its labor or capital inputs over the given period (that is, the week). It may be able to
change its material input. I assume a non-operating mine consumes materials µe m, where µ ∈ [0,1].
I ft h em i n eo p e r a t e sl subperiods, output over the period is le y. Denote the fraction of time the mine
operates by α = l/L. I assume this fraction depends on the repair staﬀ and work practice regime.
Think of the restrictive work practice regime as precluding machine operators from perform-
ing simple tasks to restart machines (tasks they could accomplish). In this regime, then, mines
hire repair staﬀ to complete these simple tasks. I denote hours by these repair workers by e nf.( I
use “f” to denote similarity with the ﬁreman case.) I denote the inputs used over the entire pe-
riod (that is, the week) by (nf,n r,n p,m,k)=( Le nf,Le nr,Le np,[l +( L − l)µ]e m,Le k). I assume that
α = α(nr,ω,n f), where ω ∈ {0,1} denotes the work practice regime (ω =0denoting no restrictive
work practices; ω =1 , the restrictive regime). I assume α(·) satisﬁes (1) increasing in nr;( 2 )i f
ω =0 ,t h e nα(nr,ω,n f) does not depend on nf (that is, adding more repair staﬀ to complete simple
tasks does not increase the speed of the system); (3) if ω =1 ,t h e nα(nr,ω,n f) increases in nf;b u t
(4) α(nr,1,n f) <α (nr,0,0) for all nf (that is, the speed of the system with ω =1is always less
than with ω =0 ). Production is then
y = e A
α
[α +( 1− α)µ]
θm (np)θnmθmkθk




























where n = nf + nr + np.
Consider the impact of loosening work practices, that is, reducing ω. The mine clearly reduces
nf to zero (from, say, an initial value of Le nf = λ, to mirror the overstaﬃng parameter in the ﬁreman
case). As an approximation, suppose the mine makes no changes in its other inputs (e nr, e np, e m, e k).
Labor productivity increases since n decreases and α(·) increases. There is both less overstaﬃng
and greater production. Now, materials productivity increases.64
Note that changes in work practices increase labor productivity in (4) through three sources:
e Aα[α +( 1− α)µ]
−θm(np/n)θn, (m/n)θm,a n d(k/n)θk (that is, through increases in TFP, materials
per hour, and capital per hour). That is, changes in work practices yield time series like Figure 6.









64Whether or not materials productivity increases does depend on parameter values and functional form assumptions.
If µ =1 ,t h e ny/m = e Aα(np/m)
θm(k/m)
θk, and loosening work practices clearly increases y/m. In the Cobb-Douglas
case, y/m may increase even if µ =0 .
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Total Factor Productivity 
Canadian Iron Ore Industry 
 
 




Productivity    / tt YN     () / Mt
S
tt MN     () / Kt
S
tt KN  
1981   1.00   1.00   1.00    1.00 
1982   0.91   0.94   0.98    1.06 
1983   0.86   0.97   1.06    1.07 
1984   0.91   1.09   1.14    1.05 
1985   1.00   1.19   1.08    1.10 
1986   1.33   1.61   1.09    1.11 
1987   1.34   1.64   1.05    1.16 
1988   1.46   1.78   1.10    1.11 
1989   1.48   1.79   1.08    1.12 
1990   1.36   1.57   1.04    1.11 
1991   1.40   1.64   1.06    1.11 
1992   1.41   1.58   1.01    1.11 
1993   1.50   1.59   1.00    1.06 
1994   1.54   1.75   1.05    1.07 





Minnesota Pellet Industry 
Decomposition of Industry Labor Productivity Growth 
(All figures in percent) 
 
 
    Share of Industry Growth Due to: 
Growth Between 
















1981   10.20    105    -16    11    0 
1982   0    —    —    —    — 
1983   13.60    79    16    5    0 
1984   55.10    93    6    1    0 
1985   67.90    97    3    0    0 
1986   77.50    87    7    6    0 
1987   121.50    77    3    14    6 
1988   108.80    76    3    15    7 
1989   101.80    73    3    16    7 
1990   100.90    95    7    -2    0 
1991   87.20    96    9    -5    0 
1992   91.70    92    9    -1    0 
1993   104.40    108    6    -13    0 
1994   113.70    106    6    -12    0 
1995   119.90    101    6    -7    0 
 
Notes: “—” means not defined (growth was zero between 1980 and 1982). Weights are mine’s 
share of industry hours. Electricity 252.2 38.3 258.1 42.8
Fuel for Vehicles 29.3 4.5 14.3 2.4
Fuel for Furnaces 85.8 13.0 51.3 8.5
Total Electricity and Fuel 367.3 55.8 323.7 53.7
Explosives 14.9 2.3 13.6 2.3
Repair Parts 42.0 6.4 48.0 8.0
Bentonite 17.1 2.6 16.1 2.7
Metallic Grinding Media 36.2 5.5 50.2 8.3
Other Supplies 161.0 24.5 117.1 19.4
Total Supplies 271.2 41.3 245.0 40.7
19.2 2.9 34.0 5.6
657.7 100.0 602.7 100.0
Table B1
Materials Spending in the U.S. Iron Ore Industry, 1982 and 1987
Spending




Total Materials (Electricity and Fuel 
plus Supplies plus Contract Work)






Pig Iron Production By Various Regions, 1950-96



































Production and Labor Productivity: Minnesota Pellet Industry
















Production and Labor Productivity: U.S. Iron Ore Industry
















(Output per hour)Figure 4:
Production and Labor Productivity: Canadian Iron Ore Industry
















(Output per Hour)Figure 5:
Materials Productivity and Capital Productivity:



















(Using Capital Stock)Figure 6:
Total Factor Productivity
(And Quantities Used in Its Calculation)






















Total Factor ProductivityFigure 7:
Production and Labor Productivity
Minnesota Pellet Mines
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Reserve / NorthshoreFigure 8:
Price of Labor Relative to Price of New Capital
vs. Capital Usage Relative to Labor Usage
Canadian Iron Ore Industry


















Price of Labor Relative to Price of Electricity vs.
Electricity Usage Relative to Labor Usage
Canadian Iron Ore Industry

















Total Hours and Repair Hours as Percentage of Total Hours
Minntac/USX Pellet Mine
















































































Repair Hours as Percentage of Total Hours
Total HoursFigure 11:
Production And Labor Productivity: Robe River Iron Ore
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